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The debate regarding the ideal response to organised crime is quickly evolving, although it 
remains often remarkably disconnected from the even more rapidly moving discussion on drugs. 
One important connection between these two debates is the application of a similar set of 
 terminology – namely that of harm reduction. Harm reduction focuses on examining policy 
responses in ways which both highlight prevention and individual and community impacts, 
including the impact of law enforcement itself. If such a lens is applied to organised crime it is 
suggested that the three areas of focus should be: the reducing of violence;  protecting  political 
processes, and reducing impunity through high level and “ symbolic”  prosecutions.
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Introduction
The discussions around drug policy and approaches to responding to organised crime are generally con-
ducted in separate rooms and by different people, which is unfortunate because both discussions impact 
and overlay the other. Not least of which is because drugs remain a major source of profit for criminal 
groups.
Yet these important debates are conducted, for the most part, in parallel. Different international fora 
handle the issues seperately, and while policy integration is at least closer in some states, there is still a 
remarkable divide between people who work in each of the areas. However, that divide may narrow in the 
futue. One reason is that shifts in national drug policies may more clearly impact the nature and evolution of 
organised crime in the years ahead. If that occurs, a stronger connection may evolve between the two largely 
segregated discussions. Importantly, both debates are at interesting inflection points.
The debate around what is generally termed ‘harm reduction’ – treating drug abuse as a health issue 
rather than a law enforcement one – has been a central feature of discussions around drug policy for at least 
the last decade. It is now gathering significant momentum as countries, most notably in Latin America and 
Europe, have embraced its core tenants.
Although a clear global consensus has emerged, what is remarkable is the degree to which the health 
policy aspects can be openly discussed in a way that was not possible even a few years ago. While this may 
not lead in the medium term to a change in the overall drug control framework itself, it has and will con-
tinue to, stretch the boundaries of what is possible within the current international drug control regime.
In contrast, on the organised crime front progress is far less clear – at least in regards to formulating a 
clearer set of more unified global responses. There are multiple initiatives underway and a clear recogni-
tion in the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda that the issue of organised crime and poor develop-
ment are closely intertwined (Reitano and Hunter 2018). Neverthless, unlike the drugs policy discussion, the 
organised crime debate remains strongly embedded in the language of law enforcement.
The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) has only just agreed to a uniform review 
mechanism and has barely broached the subject of its prevention provisions, nor drawn clear agreement 
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on how these could be implemented. Law enforcement remains the over-riding prerogative of states, 
although this belies the complexity of what is in fact the nature of organised crime in many parts of the 
world. The phenomenon covers multiple, although often overlapping, criminal markets: drugs, extortion, 
gangs, environmental crime, organised fraud, etc., which often means that the overarching discussion on 
‘organised crime’ in multilateral fora can seem far removed from how people experience in actuality. The 
TOC Convention is also heavily reliant on states as partners for implementation, while much of the challenge 
of organised crime is in places where state governments are weak or compromised (Van der Lijn 2018).
All of this suggests that these two connected (but strangely disconnected) debates on drugs and organised 
crime could draw from each other, particularly by building on the concept of what constitutes harm, and 
how that can be reduced.
In harm’s way
If asymmetrical strategies can be regarded as recognising that the particular policy problem in question 
defies a set of straight forward (symmetrical) solutions, then debates around drug policy and organised 
crime responses have some powerful connections. However, neither have easy solutions.
The term asymmetrical (a word with heavy military connotations), has its own limitations. But it is a term 
that will resonate within security establishments in that it suggests that complex problems of insecurity can-
not be tackled by a simple resort to force. Assymmetric strategies are also intimately linked to the recognition 
of the harms that may be being caused by an opponent as they ‘attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the 
‘target’ (victim) or capitalize on the victim’s limited preparation against the threat’ (Bennett et al. 1999: 3). 
Reapplied to organised crime, that sentence neatly encapsulates the eroding ‘slow burner’ effect that the 
growth of criminal organisations has on communities and societies.
Asymmetrical strategies are defined by the acceptance that security challenges are multifaceted and that 
several approaches are necessary, and that these may need to be calibrated differently for different places 
and problems. And, like all effective strategies, the application of asymmetrical tools must evolve over time 
(Smith 2006: 371–404). That notion applies to organised crime strategy as well because of the diversity of 
what the term ‘organised crime’ implies, and because the policy tools range from communication, to market 
regulation to enforcement, etc.
It is also worth noting here that the term ‘strategy’ occurs far too seldom in the debate on responding 
to organised crime. That is in part because such multi-faceted strategies, whether on the local, regional or 
national level, are complex and often opposed by law enforcement, which views response as purely within 
its domain. In the often limited viewpoint of some law enforcement leaders, such strategies do little to 
reduce organised crime and take away resources from law enforcement itself. They can also appear frag-
mented and lacking a central idea – a mass of activity without always a clear theme. There is much to learn 
from the harm reduction discussion in the drugs debate.
Reducing the harm from drugs and from organised crime arguably requires a constellation of various 
responses at different levels, to achieve success. But every strategic policy package needs a golden thread. 
In the drug policy discussion, the harm reduction responses have been quintessentially that: an attempt to 
broaden the debate from law enforcement policies alone to a wider set of alternatives, all based around the 
harm caused to individual drug users, and startegies to reduce or prevent that harm.
Harm at the back end
Language and labelling has always been an important feature of the drug policy discussion. Even though 
terms many terms such as ‘harm reduction’ are used, they may have widely different meanings in different 
contexts. However, it is seldom noted that in the context of the current debate, ‘harm reduction’ most often 
refers to a policy options where drugs are bought and used at the ‘front end’ of the market.
The term ‘harm reduction’ has over time become exclusively associated with health care policy interven-
tions related to drug use – a result of the siloed debate within the drug policy discussion itself. Yet, the term 
‘harm reduction,’ is far from a unique concern for only protaganists in the drug policy discussion, and one 
that occurs in a wider set of public policy debates (see Wolff 2011) – although the term has been historically 
excluded from debates about organized crime.
For example, development and humanitarian practitioners often refer to the ‘do no harm’ principle, mean-
ing that their actions should not exacerbate any situation where they intervene (Anderson 1999). The argu-
ments around ‘harm reduction’ in the drug policy field and the response to the war on drugs itself revolve 
around a similar premise: policy interventions should be people-centric, should aim to reduce harm, and 
should not create a greater set of harms in their implementation than are already present.
Shaw: What Could an Asymmetrical Strategy Against Organised Crime Look Like? 
A Lesson from the Drug Policy Debate
101
Despite this focus on ‘harm reduction’ and its alignment with medical and health interventions in the 
drugs debate, the orientation of the current discussion has led to ending harm reduction principles once 
the upper reaches of illicit economies are discussed: that is, essentially along the supply chains which move 
the drugs, and in countering the organised criminal groups who control them.
In fact, the failure to extend the principle of ‘harm reduction’ throughout the drug trafficking chain 
is leading to an unexpected anomaly. While ‘harm reduction’ principles applies to the front end of drug 
markets, where substances are sold and used, further up the chain, we need to renew our efforts on ‘supply 
reduction,’ identifying traffickers and combatting organised crime. This was the conclusion for example of 
the two regional Commissions on Drugs for Latin America and West Africa (OAS 2013, WACD 2014) – both 
of which were crucial to shifting drug policy debates at regional level.
All of this suggests that at the very least a new set of standard terminology is needed, one that can span 
analysis and responses across illicit drug markets from beginning to end, and particularly in responses to 
organised crime. If such a terminology can be applied across the full chain where drugs as an illegal com-
modity is concerned, then it can presumably be applied to all illicit commodities traded by criminal groups 
– and indeed to the harm caused by some of core activities of criminal operations such as extortion, targeted 
violence and the disruption of state services such as education and health.
The harm of organised crime
Identifying the harm caused by organised crime varies by market. Illicit markets and organised crime erode 
sustainable development across a range of sectors. In contexts that are fragile and livelihoods are tenuous, 
the shocks resulting from organized crime erode communities, families and individual resilience.
Whether this is in the case of the trafficking of environmental commodities such as timber or animal prod-
ucts that cause soil erosion or undermine livelihoods from tourism; the illegal mining of state resources; 
overfishing by criminal operations; health systems that are infiltrated by counterfeit pharmaceuticals; or the 
control of local drug markets decimating school systems, the cost is incalculably high (GI 2015). All the UN’s 
Sustainable Development goals are impacted by organised crime – in just over ten percent of cases achieving 
the goals are directly linked to reducing organised crime (GI 2016: 1).
But three broad and particularly powerful harms characterise most organised crime supply chains and 
across a variety of criminal markets. These are primary or significant harms – addressing them may reduce 
other harms too. They are: the harm caused by conflict or violence fuelled or associated with illicit markets; 
the harm caused by the distorting impact of illicit funds on politics and political processes; and the harm 
caused by long-standing impunity and damage to the rule of law.
In none of these cases will an exclusively law enforcement or security based response be adequate to 
address the scope of the challenge – and rational law enforcement officials are the first to recognise this 
reality. Each of the three harms results in an erosion of personal security and undercut the institutions of 
governance. Other than violence and death, the impact of all these areas is intangible. Nevertheless, each 
constitutes a powerful eroding force, subverting the very systems that allow democratic governance and 
livelihoods to be sustained. Thus, none of the responses in these three areas is on its own a law enforcement 
response.
Indeed, to conceive of the responses too narrowly will mean that a focus on developing more comprehen-
sive and sophisticated alternatives would have been lost from the outset. These three issues are novel ideas, 
but they have not been as directly connected to the discussion on global policy responses to organised crime 
as is warranted by a more coherent and strategic approach. Each of the three areas is discussed briefly in turn.
Ending conflict and violence
There is perhaps no clearer connection between conflict, fragility and the presence of organised crime or 
illicit trafficking than the steady uptick of Security Council resolutions which link them. The Council, con-
cerned as it is with issues of ‘peace and security,’ has mentioned or referred to the issue of organised crime 
or illicit trafficking in just over a third of all its resolutions between 2000 and 2017.1
Also important is the fact that the number of mentions of organised crime in Security Council resolutions 
has increased; peaking in 2014, when a remarkable 63 percent of resolutions mentioned or referred to the 
issue of illicit trafficking and organised crime. That is a remarkable development – but it is one that is not 
often mentioned nor well understood.
 1 The data Security Council Resolutions is drawn from a yet unpublished review of all resolutions between 2000 and 2017 conducted 
by the GI. 
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Such an increase suggests that there is a rapid growth and connection between a diversity of conflicts in 
the current global context and linkages to organised crime. Yet, policy responses are narrow, often confined 
to, for example, increasing the police component of UN peacekeeping missions – and not necessarily ensur-
ing that they have the skills or mandate to take on complex investigations (see Van der Lijn 2018).
The policy discussion on conflict spaces and organised crime therefore remains remarkably restricted, 
with great scope for rethinking how we approach this area. For example, efforts to build better information 
resources and empower the UN to collect ‘crime intelligence’ have edged slowly forward, but capacities 
remain weak. Furthermore, a narrow focus only on conflict zones is itself misplaced. Outside of countries 
in conflict, violence and homicide cause great human and financial costs:– in fact, in some cases ordinary 
levels of criminal violence are greater then reported deaths from conflict zones (Fearon and Hoeffler 2014).
The 2011 World Development Report calculated that areas exposed to prolonged violence and conflict 
experienced a 20 percent loss in development performance in comparison to more stable and peaceful 
peers (World Bank 2011). Yet pervasive violence is often the result of a complex overlay between political 
and criminal elements as well as economic exclusion. In marginal areas, such violence, particularly high 
homicide rates, is often the result of street or gang violence around low-level drug markets, which is at 
its highest when the markets are the process of consolidating. As Nicholas Barnes notes in an important 
recent article,
‘organised crime and its violence is very much a political pheneomenon as criminal organisations 
negotiate (sometimes violently) with the state over not just the control of the drug trade or access 
to illicit markets but over who is the dominant authority on a local level: who controls violence, 
provides order, and makes the rules that govern society’ (2017: 967).
Take the case of Cape Town, where the 2014 homicide rate is 60 murders per 100,000 people (and in some 
places over 100 per 100,000, closer to what might be regarded as a conflict zone) (Kriegler and Shaw 2016). 
That rate, which has increased exponentially over the last couple of years, is a direct result of gang conflicts 
fuelled by efforts to control local drug markets in alignment with corrupt police. The negative impact has 
been significantly more severe because of the criminal sale of surplus weaponry from the police armoury to 
gang leaders. These are in essence criminal conflicts overlain with politics, competition between the state 
and gangs, and collusion between parts of the security establishment and criminal networks (Shaw 2017).
A number of the governments in Central and South America have noted that the war on drugs is just as 
potent and violent as any intra-state conflict or insurgency (Whaites 2015). The increasing power of criminal 
groups in Latin America has created a violent threat to children and youngsters who cannot achieve a decent 
lifestyle in their home states, triggering large scale displacement of populations both inside and outside 
their countries, with significant humanitarian and protection consequences (Atuesta 2014).
Central American cities, many of which have homicide rates above 100 victims per 100,000 people, suffer 
from the problem in an extreme form. In Central America and Mexico, an estimated 30 percent of murders 
are directly attributed to organised crime or gang violence (UNODC 2013) although some estimates for 
Mexico are far higher – up to 75 percent (Dittmar 2018). Violence, and the threat thereof, is used as a means 
of criminal control, with extortion serving as system of disorted taxation aimed at buying security.
Regrettably, despite extensive efforts, we have surprisingly little to show for our efforts to reduce street-
level gang related drug violence in the cities of the developing world. Efforts that have focused on the 
manifestations of violence and conflict without assessing the role of illicit flows and criminal networks 
as causal factors have similarly been unsuccessful. For example, analysis of experimentation with gang 
truces, including those most recently in the Americas between 2012–14, showed that the most successful 
truces achieved their primary objective to reduce the rate of violent homicides in the short term, but in the 
medium to long-term they struggled to achieve sustainability whilst trafficking activities continued (Katz 
and Amaya 2015).
This debate is not new, but the challenge is now of great urgency, with the growth of mega-cities and the 
intersection between drugs, criminal networks and terrorism in several of them (Shelley 2014). However, 
violence is not associated with all criminal markets, and is often locally contained, amongst the most 
 marginalised, in major urban complexes. This necessitates that we need to consider urban security, redou-
bling our efforts to seek better solutions for the urban poor, and a concerted effort to make a linkage 
between security and development issues, not in order to “securitise” development, but in order to protect 
development interventions from criminal exploitation – and to deliver services where they are needed most.
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Protecting political processes
A second, and related question, is the harm related to illicit trafficking and its impact on political processes, 
most pertinently illegal money entering into politics or funding political interests. This is of increasing con-
cern in many developing countries where drug trafficking is prevalent. Our own recent study of the burgeon-
ing heroin trade along the East African coast suggests just how significantly drug profits can influence local 
political economies (Haysom et al. 2018). For example, in Mozambique an apparent long-term pact between 
the ruling party and drug traffickers has allowed the country to be used as a transit route, while filling 
political party coffers and sustaining patronage networks (Ibid.). The same applies in many other countries, 
particularly as the emphasis on reducing the levels of violence around political campaigning has required 
more insidious and covert levels of political manipulation (IDEA 2013).
Given the absence of electoral transparency, legislation in the majority of jurisdictions is lacking, and even 
where the legislation exists, the capacity to oversee, regulate and enforce that legislation is inadequate. 
Consequently, understanding the influence of key criminal figures on political and electoral process is a 
significant challenge. The modus operandi of important criminal figures is to ensure that they have political 
protection to safeguard their businesses and ensure that they are not prosecuted.
One of the most effective ways of enuring political protection is to provide much needed funding to politi-
cal parties, and by securing the political endorsement of those in a position to create and enforce the law. 
This has created a degree of complicity between criminal enterprises and politics in many jurisidctions. In 
South Africa, in what has been termed locally as ‘state capture,’, a single family owned business dominated 
engagements between the private sector and the state, dramatically eroding the institutions of governance 
while strengthening systems of patronage (Myburgh 2017).
It follows that a set of policy solutions beyond simple support to law enforcement agencies is required. 
This new policy must focus on raising the costs of blurring the distinctions between crime and politics: or 
what a pathbreaking recent study of India shows to be a ‘symbiosis of crime and politics’ where ‘democratic 
elections and large numbers of elected officials tied to illegal activity can comfortably exist’ (Vaishnav 2017: 
13). There are no easy solutions, but we must start with a greater focus on the issue of political party funding 
and from where it is drawn. This must be combined with sustained support for civil society and free media 
in countries where criminal funding plays a significant role in shaping political choices.
An end to impunity
As this association and criminalisation of the state continues and strengthens, the result is the creation of 
widespread impunity for criminal acts. Impunity is harmful because it generally allows high-level traffick-
ers (often with political connections) to operate illicit activities unimpeded, while lower-level individuals 
are targeted: people who are almost always from excluded and marginalised communities. In many con-
texts, those involved in protecting drug trafficking activity accumulate enormous influence and are nearly 
immune from punishment. This is particularly true in states where justice institutions have been compro-
mised or weakened, such as in periods of conflict or post-conflict.
In many, although not all, such instances there is little chance of justice being served. In Guinea-Bissau 
and in several Central American states, police, prosecutors, and judges are often too scared or too compro-
mised to challenge the powerful (ICG 2017). Those who engage in drug trafficking and those who protect 
them are highly unlikely to be prosecuted. That level of impunity causes severe damage to states, undercut-
ting their long-term ability to deliver services and compromising key institutions – a tangible set of harms, 
in particular for the poor who rely on state services and infrastructure. How to end impunity in such cases is 
and will be a key challenge for future policy making. So, what options are available?
The standard international response has been to provide training and institutional support for law enforce-
ment agencies. But such efforts are largely wasted when there is little protection for those officials who will 
have to conduct high-level investigations, arrests and prosecutions. No matter how willing or well-trained 
the police were in Guinea-Bissau for example, there was little chance of making significant progress (Shaw 
2015). Where arrests were made and drugs or money seized, ‘high-level’ interventions quickly ensured that 
the good work was undone.
What is required are responses that partner across borders, to provide alternatives to compromised institu-
tions. In many cases this is only possible when states have become so weak that international intervention 
is mandated by the Security Council, or at least when an intervention can no longer be resisted by cor-
rupt elites. Such partnerships create important precedents and lessons that can be applied in future cases 
(Cockayne 2013).
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An important (and unexplored) example of rule of law partnership occurred in the case of maritime piracy 
where courts in neighbouring states (Kenya, and the Seychelles) tried suspects from a state (Somalia) where 
justice infrastructure was weak or compromised (Warner 2013). Although admittedly this did not lead to the 
arrest and trial of high-level people, it was a unique partnership between developed and developing coun-
tries. While it presented a range of political challenges for both sides, it was largely successful in bringing 
to trial low-level pirates, sending an important and widespread message about the need for respect for the 
rule of law.
Over a longer period, a UN Commission has acted to investigate high-level government officials in 
Guatemala on organised crime and corruption charges. While the results have arguably been mixed, the 
Commission has played a key recent role in a major corruption scandal that brought down the government 
(ICG 2011).
While important, high-level targeting and prosecutions are not by themselves sufficient to revitalize a 
weak justice sector and support it in a fight against organised crime. In order for actions that reduce impu-
nity to have a long-lasting effect, they must be coupled with measures to increase the exposure of criminals 
and other drivers of illicit activities and organised crime in general. Such programmes complement the high-
level interventions to reduce impunity by making it more difficult to achieve impunity in the first place.
In the future, the question should be less about how assistance can be delivered to law enforcement 
agencies, but rather how a set of institutions can be created that build a partnership between different 
interests and seek to isolate corrupt or criminal elites. Could a regional court to try drug trafficking cases 
be agreed in West Africa for example? Can we push forward more cases (such as in Guatemala) where 
internal and external partners work together in new hybrid institutions, protected from local corrupting 
influences, to bring high-level traffickers, within the framework of the rule of law, in front of legitimate 
and working courts? Developing such arrangements must be the focus of global public policy responses 
to organised crime.
Conclusion: Towards asymmetrical organised crime strategies
If the concept of reducing harm is applied to the challenge of countering organised crime, the policy filter 
through which we measure success shifts significantly. At the outset it changes the debate on which policy 
areas to concentrate, and within these areas it challenges us to think more clearly about how to measure 
actual achievement through a reduction in harm. However, adopting this approach requires a significant 
reallocation of resources and a more global response to the challenge. It also shifts the response to one that 
is only about strengthening domestic law enforcement.
That is not easy to achieve: much aid and donor assistance in the area of organised crime is now chan-
nelled in ways that seek to reduce the threat to the donor country alone. These are understandable, but 
often short sighted, ways of combatting a problem that is acting as a ‘slow burner.’ The extent of the damage 
to these countries becomes public in spurts in the form of high profile cases or damaging incidents, while 
the overall impact of the illicit economy is to erode governance and development over time.
Issues such as urban violence, while spoken of as key policy challenges, seldom received significant 
resources, often because they occur in marginalised and impoverished communities. But these ‘bleeding 
sores’ require resolution if effective stability and development are to be attained in many parts of the 
world.
It is an oft-mentioned conclusion to speeches at global policy fora on organised crime that we need a 
unified and global approach. Without a clear and simple policy framework, such as that proposed in the 
drug policy discussion to ‘reduce harm,’ we will not be able to craft a truly strategic response to organised 
crime.
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